Doodle Around the World: Online Scheduling Behavior Reﬂects Cultural Differences in Time Perception and Group Decision-Making by Reinecke, Katharina et al.
 
Doodle Around the World: Online Scheduling Behavior Reects




(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Reinecke, Katharina, Minh Khoa Nguyen, Abraham Bernstein,
Michael Näf, and Krzysztof Z. Gajos. 2013. “Doodle around the
world: Online scheduling behavior reflects cultural differences in
time perception and group decision-making.” In Proceedings of
the 16th ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative
Work (CSCW '13), San Antonion, TX, February 23-27, ed. Amy
Bruckman, Scott Counts, Cliff Lampe, Loren G. Terveen, 45-54.
New York, NY: ACM Press.
Published Version doi:10.1145/2441776.2441784
Accessed February 19, 2015 5:15:21 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12561360
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAPDoodle Around the World:
Online Scheduling Behavior Reﬂects Cultural Differences in
Time Perception and Group Decision-Making












Event scheduling is a group decision-making process in
which social dynamics inﬂuence people’s choices and the
overall outcome. As a result, scheduling is not simply a mat-
ter of ﬁnding a mutually agreeable time, but a process that
is shaped by social norms and values, which can highly vary
between countries. To investigate the inﬂuence of national
culture on people’s scheduling behavior we analyzed more
than 1.5 million Doodle date/time polls from 211 countries.
We found strong correlations between characteristics of na-
tional culture and several behavioral phenomena, such as that
poll participants from collectivist countries respond earlier,
agree to fewer options but ﬁnd more consensus than predom-
inantly individualist societies. Our study provides empirical
evidence of behavioral differences in group decision-making
and time perception with implications for cross-cultural col-
laborative work.
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INTRODUCTION
It might not be surprising that the origin of the popular event
scheduling tool Doodle [11] lies in Switzerland—the country
of accurate clocks and “Swiss efﬁciency”. Doodle addresses
the problem of deciding on a mutually agreeable time by let-
ting users create polls with several date and time options. Af-
ter participants indicate their availability, poll initiators can
easily determine the best time for the event.
On the surface, such event scheduling processes may appear
to be simply a matter of matching availabilities of those in-
volved. But before it is possible to ﬁnd a suitable time, poll
initiators and participants have to make a range of decisions.
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What, for example, if participants do not make themselves
availablewhenevertheycouldinordertoavoidmakingatem-
porary commitment for these times? What if they indicate
availability for less convenient options just because they do
not want to inhibit ﬁnding a mutually agreeable time? And
what if they do so because of social norms and procedures
that inﬂuence their behavior?
We see event scheduling as a group decision-making pro-
cess [13] in which “a set of individual preferences are
transformed into a group choice by a certain social proce-
dure” [22]. Researchers have observed that societal norms
and values differ between countries and determine how
groups negotiate individual choices and reach consensus [12,
3, 7]. In countries that are believed to have collectivist and
more community-oriented cultures, such as China or Japan,
people see themselves as part of a group, and prefer collec-
tive decision-making with distributed responsibilities [31]. In
individualist countries, as for example the US, people seem
to be less concerned with harmony, and are less affected by
the decisions of others [31].
Such variations in social procedures between countries lead
to our main research question: Does (national) culture deter-
mine how we schedule events online?
To answer this question, we analyzed more than 1.5 million
anonymized Doodle date/time polls, which had been initi-
ated in 211 countries. Our ﬁndings empirically support sev-
eral assumptions of cultural differences in group decision-
making and time perception. For example, we found that
in comparison to predominantly individualist societies, poll
participants from collectivist countries respond earlier, agree
to fewer options but ﬁnd more consensus. More generally,
our results demonstrate that Internet users have not converged
into a homogeneous subcultural group with the same behav-
ioral norms across the world, but that their use of technology
considerably differs between countries. We discuss the im-
plications of these ﬁndings for collaborative work within and
across cultures, and suggest strategies for designing schedul-
ing tools that raise awareness of cultural differences, or en-
courage behavioral change.
GROUPWARE CALENDARS AND EVENT SCHEDULING
Many of today’s electronic calendar systems, such as Lotus
Notes or Microsoft Outlook, provide a signiﬁcant advantage
1over their paper predecessors by allowing users to match their
availabilities with others in order to schedule events. One of
their downsides is that users need to ensure that all their plans
are captured in their calendars. Moreover, they need to ex-
plicitly allow others to access their schedules [14] and by do-
ing so, users automatically disclose personal availability pat-
terns [24]. Although most systems enable users to hide any
detailed information (e.g., the occasion of an event) research-
ers have raised concerns over people’s privacy [24]. Further,
these systems do not capture users’ complex scheduling pref-
erences [6], such as preferring afternoon meetings unless the
meeting is with a boss or a colleague in a different time zone.
Online scheduling systems such as Doodle make a different
trade-off: users disclose their availability in the context of
a particular event, which allows them to keep their overall
schedules private [24] and to make context-speciﬁc judge-
ments about which times to make available for a particular ac-
tivity. However, such systems impose additional work on all
attendees and in some cases may create the expectation that
the invitees will keep open all the times they reported as avail-
able until the results of the poll have been announced [35].
Thus, to remain in control of one’s own time, people have
been found to “schedule defensively” [35], or in other words,
to lie about their availabilities, and to manipulate the system
for their own beneﬁt [41]. By being very selective about one’s
availabilities, participants could, for instance, inﬂuence the
outcome of the scheduling process to suit their own prefer-
ences rather than attempting to ﬁnd an option that maximizes
the collective utility [41].
So far, much research has focused on inferring users’ com-
plex preferences from past scheduling decisions [6] and on
mechanisms for encouraging users to report their availabili-
ties truthfully, for example by using game-theoretic mecha-
nisms [13], or by employing an auction system [41]. Other
studies looked at the use of calendars, and at social behaviors
related to sharing availabilities [2]. Palen [35, 36] conducted
a study of the use of groupware calendars at Sun Microsys-
tems, and found that users were willing to share information
about their availabilities if it beneﬁted the scheduling process
within their group. Geyer et al. [14] investigated the use of a
social calendar that combined calendaring and microblogging
withinIBM.SimilarlytoPalen’sﬁndings, theyconcludedthat
users were willing to share most of their availability informa-
tion within the enterprise.
Our work has a different focus in that we examine the
scheduling processes that emerge when people do not have to
disclosetheiravailabilities, asitisthecaseonDoodle. Weex-
tend related work by empirically investigating the social dy-
namics that are inherent in such group decision-making, and
provide the ﬁrst large-scale comparison of people’s schedul-
ing behavior between multiple countries.
SCHEDULING EVENTS WITH DOODLE
Doodle date/time polls enable an initiator to ﬁnd the best time
for an event, by deﬁning a poll that lists all viable options.
Participants make choices by selecting those options that are
consistent with their availability and preferences. Underneath
Figure 1. An example of a Doodle date/time poll, where the second op-
tion reached consensus among all three participants.
a poll, Doodle provides a summary of how many participants
have selected each option, and highlights those that currently
represent the majority vote. In Figure 1, for example, all
three participants indicated availability over lunch on “Mon
12”, so this option received consensus among all participants.
Date/time polls also allow initiators to deﬁne optional set-
tings, such as enabling an if-need-be choice (instead of just
yes or no) or using a hidden poll, where participants cannot
see each other’s answers.
HYPOTHESES
Like other group decision-making processes, event schedul-
ing follows certain “social procedures” [22]. It starts with
speciﬁc choices made by an initiator (“Which times suit me
best? Do I want participants to see each others’ answers?”)
and is then passed on to individual decisions of participants
(“When am I available? Should I disclose a less convenient
time?”). However, instead of making our decisions indepen-
dently, we usually look at the choices of others and consider
how our own choice might affect the group outcome, or our
standing within this group (“What have others chosen? What
will they think of me if I make this choice?”).
Because social procedures are formed by cultural values, we
assume that both theindividual decisions, as well as thesocial
dynamics found in the overall group decision-making process
will be different between countries. Indeed, previous research
suggests that people’s thinking, behavior, and preferences are
formed by cultural inﬂuences [23] stemming from the lan-
guage we speak, our religion, education, social and political
norms, and values [26]. With that, culture becomes a “rich
complex of meanings, beliefs, practices, symbols, norms, and
values prevalent among people in a society” [37]—making it
an intangible construct that does not allow easy comparison.
No two people can possibly have exactly the same culture, but
cultural groups often share similar thinking and behavior. Re-
search on decision-making theory has contrasted such behav-
ioral tendencies between countries (e.g., [1, 31]) and, thus,
compared behavioral trends between national cultures [19].
To facilitate these comparisons, cultural anthropologists at-
tempted to describe culture with a deﬁnite set of constructs,
so-called cultural dimensions. Hall [15, 16], for example,
proposed to differentiate cultures by their polychronic versus
monochronic time orientation. He suggested that in coun-
tries that are predominantly polychronic (e.g., in China), hu-
man interactions are more important than time and this is of-
ten expressed by a much more relaxed attitude when need-
ing to “get things done”. On the contrary, predominantly
monochronic countries (e.g., Germany) show a greater con-
cern for time management, including advance planning and
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(b) Collectivism vs. Individualism
Figure 2. Overview of Inglehart’s Survival/Self-expression values (a) and Hofstede’s Individualism dimension (b). Darker colors stand for a higher
Self-expression or Individualism score, respectively. Medium colors indicate scores 0:5 of the medium Survival/Self-expression, or 10 of the world
average score (43) for Individualism. Gray areas mark countries that have not been included in Inglehart’s or Hofstede’s study.
time; in their life, an external clock dictates the start and
end of events [28]. Polychronic cultures schedule their life
more loosely around event time, where activities determine
the course of the day, and multiple activities can take place at
the same time [28]. Ending a discussion simply because an-
other meeting is scheduled to start would be out of question
for cultures on event time. Monochronic cultures can clash
with this understanding, as they would expect punctuality and
adherence to previously assigned schedules.
Differences in time perception have also been attributed to the
extent to which people think of themselves as autonomous in-
dividuals with an interest in self-expression and a high qual-
ity of life that industrialization brought with it, in compari-
son to seeing themselves more as interdependent parts of a
group, such as the family [38]. The phenomenon is usually
described as Individualism versus Collectivism [38, 19], or
Self-expression versus Survival [20].
Hofstede’s Individualism/Collectivism dimension is one of
ﬁve that emerged from a large-scale quantitative study at IBM
in 74 countries [18]. All countries in his study received a
score on each of the ﬁve dimensions, facilitating comparisons
between their national cultures. Hofstede’s study is older than
the Self-expression/Survival scores of Inglehart [20], but the
link between his Individualism scores and several behavioral
phenomena has been well-explored, such as to measure vari-
ances in decision-making styles. Moreover, they have been
explicitly linked to societies’ concern with time, making it an
interesting construct for our study to relate to.
Inglehart’s Self-expression/Survival dimension emerged
within the scope of the World Value Survey [40], which
aims to track social and political changes with the help
of country scores that have been collected in ﬁve waves
of surveys, from 1981 to 2007. Thus, the scores for this
dimension are arguably more up-to-date, the survey stud-
ies a broader population, and offers comparison between
slightly more countries. To our knowledge, however, it has
not been investigated in the context of decision-making,
or directly linked to the perception of time. While the
Individualism and Self-expression constructs slightly differ
in their meaning, the country scores of both dimensions
signiﬁcantly correlate with each other [20]. In Hofstede’s
study, the US is the most individualist country with a score
of 91, and Guatemala is “most collectivist” with a score of 6.
Inglehart’s Survival/Self-expression dimension ranges from
-2 to around 2.5, with many Scandinavian countries being
high on Self-expression and Russia, Bulgaria, or the Ukraine
having one of the lowest positions on the Survival/Self-
expression value axis. Figure 2 shows a world overview of
countries that are believed to score higher in self-expression
versus survival based on the latest scores of the world value
survey [40], and which ones are more individualist or more
collectivist based on Hofstede’s country scores [18, 19]. We
include both dimensions in our analysis to see how useful the
Survival/Self-expression value is as a predictor for cultural
differences in decision-making and time perception. As
we will later see, both dimensions explain these cultural
variations similarly well, and in combination, they help to
explain some of the outliers that we see in our data.
Comparisons of national cultures always run the risk of
stereotyping all people within one country [32], and thus,
these kind of studies have to be seen as contrasting behav-
ioral tendencies. This is especially interesting in our case, be-
cause Doodle users likely share a certain subculture, making
the comparison of national cultures more meaningful [37].
Because Doodle users use the Internet, they are likely more
educatedandyoungerthantheaverageperson[34]. Ifwepre-
sume that Doodle users have a comparable subculture—thus,
controlling for these factors—then differences in the schedul-
ing behavior between countries are likely due to the inﬂuence
of other cultural values.
Time Perception, Pace of Life, and Afﬂuence
Doodle enhances efﬁciency by reducing the time required to
schedule an event. We assume that Doodle users are primar-
ily from those cultures that are highly concerned with time,
which has been linked to Individualism [38]. Highly individ-
ualist societies (marked with a darker color in Figure 2(b))
are believed to emphasize individual achievements, and to
feel a greater need to save time [27]. Similarly, time is used
to structure days in monochronic cultures such as Germany,
Switzerland, United States, and Scandinavia much more than
in polychronic cultures (e.g., Egypt, Mexico, or India). We
therefore hypothesize that individualist societies use Doodle
more often than collectivist societies, and will compare the
3results with Hall’s polychronic versus monochronic time ori-
entation [15].
[H.1.1] The number of polls per internet user positively cor-
relates with Individualism.
Researchershavealsoarguedthatsomecountriesaremorein-
dividualist than others because of their higher afﬂuence [38].
Economic development has been attributed as a cause for cul-
tural change, leading to a higher demand for self-expression
[20]. If our ﬁrst hypothesis is in fact true, then the number
of polls should increase with a country’s per capita gross do-
mestic product (GDP):
[H.1.2] The number of polls per internet user positively cor-
relates with the GDP per capita.
Additionally, we assume that people use Doodle with a higher
frequency in countries with a higher tempo. Levine and
Norenzayan [27] compared people’s walking speed, the work
speed amongst postal clerks, and the accuracy of bank clocks
in 31 countries. Their study resulted in a ranking for each of
these indicators, as well as in an overall pace of life index,
with the fastest countries being in Western Europe and Japan,
and the slowest in countries with less vital economies. We
assume that the arithmetic means of each country’s pace of
life, as they are provided by Levine and Norenzayan, paral-
lels how often people use Doodle:
[H.1.3] The number of polls per internet user correlates with
the pace of life country ranking.
Planning Ahead, Punctuality, and Response Time
Time is often mentioned as the most striking difference be-
tween cultures that divides the world into notorious planners
and those who spontaneously get together. Countries with
a fast pace of life and a high Individualism are generally
thought to be monochromic, and on clock time [28]. People
in these countries place more importance on time manage-
ment and planning [25, 38], but might be less spontaneous
and plan their events more in advance:
[H.2.1] People in individualist countries initiate Doodle polls
further ahead of time than do collectivist countries.
The importance of time goes in line with expectations on
punctuality [4, 15, 39]. We assume that people specify the
time of a meeting option more precisely in individualist soci-
eties in which people live by clock time [28]. Deﬁning a poll
option as 11:15 a.m. indicates a higher level of precision than
simply clock face time, and presumably, a higher expectation
of punctuality. A date with a text string, e.g.,“afternoon”, or
“sometime in the evening”, is less precise than 11 a.m., but
more precise than just a date.
[H.2.2] Countries with a higher Individualism use the time
option for scheduling meetings more precisely.
Culture also inﬂuences whether we feel the need to optimize
time [5]. In individualist societies, where “time is money”,
people feel the need to speed up negotiation processes and
decisionsingeneral[30]. Wecouldthereforeassumethatpar-
ticipants from countries with a high score in Individualism re-
spond to polls more quickly than collectivist participants. On
the other hand, individualists, for whom time is often more
important than human interactions [15], might be strategizing
morebydeferringacommitmenttospeciﬁcoptionsaslongas
possible. If they respond to a poll too early, their time choices
might be already outdated before the poll initiator informs of
the ﬁnal choice. However, if participants defer the decision,
other time constraints will already be known, therefore facil-
itating the decision without a long-term commitment of their
time. Hence, we put forward a non-directional hypothesis:
[H.2.3] The average response time per country correlates
with the dimension Individualism.
Consensus and Dependency of Choices
The notion of “social proof” [9] describes the human ten-
dency to follow other people’s decisions and choices. Social
proof is assumed to be more prevalent in collectivist coun-
tries (e.g., Taiwan, China, or Japan), where people have a
greater desire for harmony and blending in [1]. This also par-
allels a higher reluctance of people in collectivist cultures to
independently make decisions [31]: Study participants from
Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan reported a higher preference
for collective decisions—thus, sharing responsibility—and a
higher tendency to completely hand over responsibility to an
authority [31]. People in individualist countries show a dif-
ferent decision-making behavior, sometimes driven by the de-
sire to be unique [1]. They report a greater conﬁdence in their
own decision-making ability, and make choices more inde-
pendently of others [31].
Such autonomous decision-making has been linked to high
self-expression values [20]. Society’s economic success usu-
ally changes the political climate in favor of an increasing
demand for democratic rights [21]. The emerging emphasis
on independent choices in more democratic countries might
be mirrored in people’s scheduling behavior: Doodle users
from highly economically viable countries and with high
self-expression scores might insist on their democratic right
to vote independently, and thus, pay less attention to the
choices of others. In contrast, Doodle users from community-
oriented, collectivist countries might try harder to match the
decision of others, and to ﬁnd mutual agreement.
We assume that the number of options that reach consen-
sus within a poll is higher in collectivist countries, and the
same should be true for the Survival/Self-expression dimen-
sion. We deﬁne “consensus” as reaching agreement among
all participants, but not necessarily on all options.
[H.3.1] The fraction of options that reach consensus within
open polls negatively correlates with Individualism.
According to the social proof theory, the decision outcome
can be substantially inﬂuenced if the preferences of others
are visible [9]. In particular, we hypothesize that partici-
pants have the goal to ﬁnd mutual agreement, and that they
will therefore adjust their availabilities to ﬁnd more consen-
sus options. The hidden polls in our data set provide us with
a convenient baseline: If participants cannot see each other’s
choices, any inﬂuence of this sort can be ruled out. In our
analysis, we will therefore also contrast the assumption of the
previous hypothesis with hidden polls versus open polls:
4[H.3.2] The fraction of options that reach consensus is higher
in open polls than in hidden polls.
According to the ﬁndings of Mann et al. [31], we further as-
sume that participants from collectivist countries with more
group-oriented cultures tend to “pass the buck”, meaning that
they avoid making decisions themselves. Furthermore, col-
lectivists have a stronger desire to comply with others [1].
This could result in a corresponding avoidance of declining
an option in a poll:
[H.3.3] The fraction of options that participants agree to
within open polls negatively correlates with Individualism.
Correspondingly, we assume that participants from collec-
tivist countries prefer declining an option less decisively.
We assume that participants from group-oriented collectivist
countries select if-need-be more often than participants from
individualist countries:
[H.3.4] The fraction of times that people select “if-need-be”
negatively correlates with Individualism.
DATA PREPARATION AND ANALYSIS
We analyzed 1,771,430 anonymized date/time polls provided
to us by Doodle. The polls were selected at random from a
timeperiodinmid-2011andanadditionaltimeperiodinearly
2012. Both sets of polls showed consistent results, so the fol-
lowing analyses report on the merged data set. As part of the
data preparation, we excluded polls that did not have any par-
ticipant responses. Our ﬁnal data set contains 1,536,022 polls
initiated by users from 211 countries1 (m = 9.14, sd = 58.2
polls per country). On average, these polls have 5 participants
(sd = 1.4) and 13.5 options (sd = 15.2).
Correlations between two variables were analyzed with
Spearman’s r (two-tailed) given that our data was sig-
niﬁcantly non-normal (Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests showing
p < :05 for all variables). P-values were adjusted for multi-
ple hypothesis testing using the Benjamini-Hochberg correc-
tion. We compared two dependent conditions (e.g., the dif-
ference between hidden and open polls) using the Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, and several independent conditions (e.g., the
countries) with the Kruskal-Wallis test.
The correlation analyses report on a subset of the 211 coun-
tries: First, when relating to the dimension Individualism, we
employ the scores from Hofstede’s study [18], which were
available for 76 of the countries in our data set. Levine’s
study on the pace of life [27] comprised timing data for 31
countries, all of which were also included in our data set. In
addition, we used the Survival/Self-expression scores of 68
of the countries included in the World Value Survey [40].
In favor of higher validity, the subset of countries was further
reduced when we evaluated behavior on a poll or participant
level. The advance planning and response time was analyzed
for a subset of 828,560 polls and 177 countries for which
we were able to retrieve the poll initiation time stamps. Our
correlation analyses are based on 47 of these countries that
1Countries were automatically derived from IP addresses with the
help of the Maxmind GeoIP database. IP addresses were not re-
vealed to the researchers at any time.
have an Individualism score, and 50 that have a Survival/Self-
Expression score. To evaluate the hypotheses related to con-
sensus (H.3.*), we used 52 countries that had more than 100
pollsandatleast5hiddenpolls. Lastly, theanalysisforH.3.4.
compares 37 countries that have used the “if-need-be” option,
received an Individualism score and had at least 50 polls.
For the calculation of the advance planning time, we com-
puted the average time difference per country between the
poll initiation time stamp and the time given for the ﬁrst op-
tion. For polls that only speciﬁed a date, or date and text (e.g.,
morning, or afternoon), we used midday as the time of the
ﬁrst option. The average response time per country was cal-
culated by subtracting the average of participants’ response
times per poll from the poll initiation time stamp. Finally,
the number of polls that reach consensus within a country
wascalculatedbytakingintoaccountpollswhereparticipants
found mutual agreement for at least one option divided by the
overall number of polls per country.
To mitigate the inﬂuence of population size and internet pen-
etration, we calculated the number of polls per capita and the
number of polls per internet users. Population data and infor-
mation about each country’s per capita gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP, available for 205 countries) was derived from [8]
and supplemented with information from [33].
Variables such as consensus options were normalized based
on the number of options per poll. For comparisons between
countries, we further adjusted our data for the number of polls
per country.
RESULTS
All hypotheses and their results are summarized in Table 1.
[H.1.1] Our results support the hypothesis that the higher a
country’s Individualism score, the more likely its people are
to schedule events with Doodle. As Table 2 shows, it is
mostly Western countries that lead the list of Doodle users.
Thesecountriesareregardedasmonochronicculturesthatuse
time to structure days much more than predominantly poly-
chronic cultures. All countries in the left column are highly
individualist cultures, but the right column shows some out-
liers: Singapore has a score of 20, clearly marking it as a
collectivist country. Lebanon and Hong Kong are regarded
as collectivist societies with a score of 38 and 25, respec-
tively. Bermuda and Cambodia were not included in Hofst-
ede’s study, but both can be assumed to predominantly show
collectivist traits. There could be multiple reasons that these
countries are showing a comparatively high scheduling activ-
ity: Singapore and Hong Kong are both examples of huge
economic growth. Bermuda is a tax haven and it could well
be that Doodle is being used by the many expats living in the
country. The high scheduling activity could, however, also be
the result of changing work practices in these countries.
The neighboring countries Liechtenstein and Switzerland are
much more likely to schedule events with Doodle than any
other country in our data set, which could be partly attributed
to the fact that Doodle is a Swiss company. Doodle’s up-
take was highly supported by word-of-mouth communica-
tion, which suggests that its adoption rate might be higher
5Time Perception, Pace of Life, and Afﬂuence
H.1.1 The number of polls per internet user and country positively correlates with Individualism. rs(74) = :65;p < :001
H.1.2 The number of polls per internet user and country positively correlates with the GDP per capita. rs(203) = :57;p < :001
H.1.3 The number of polls per internet user correlates with the pace of life country ranking. rs(29) =  :67;p < :001
Planning Ahead, Punctuality, and Response Time
H.2.1 People in individualist countries initiate Doodle polls further ahead of time than do collectivist countries. rs(45) = :60;p < :001
H.2.2 Countries with a higher Individualism use the time option for scheduling meetings more precisely. partly supported:
rs(56) = :31;p < :05
H.2.3 The average response time per country correlates with Individualism. rs(45) = :50;p < :001
Consensus and Dependency of Choices
H.3.1 The fraction of options that reach consensus within open polls negatively correlates with Individualism. rs(50) =  :32;p < :05
H.3.2 The fraction of options that reach consensus is higher in open polls than in hidden polls. Z(58) =  6:53;
p < :001;r =  :86
H.3.3 The fraction of options that participants agree to within open polls negatively correlates with Individualism. Inverted:
rs(50) = :62;p < :001
H.3.4 The fraction of times that people select “if-need-be” negatively correlates with Individualism. rs(35) =  :31;p < :1
Table 1. Summary of the hypotheses and results. P-values were adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing using the Benjamini-Hochberg correction.
in neighboring countries and those with similar languages.
However, even when excluding Switzerland from the analy-
sis2, the relationship between Individualism and the number
of polls remains strong, rs(73) = :64, p < :001.








Liechtenstein 2,540 110.430 United Kingdom 60,686 1.180
Switzerland 358,108 58.210 France 53,131 1.174
Austria 47,721 7.768 Bermuda 53 0.982
Germany 405,381 6.225 Sweden 7,963 0.948
Belgium 45,309 5.585 Malta 195 0.811
Luxembourg 1,788 4.212 Israel 3,426 0.757
Denmark 15,774 3.321 New Zealand 2,507 0.737
Canada 81,129 3.009 Singapore 2,372 0.733
USA 602,419 2.459 Netherlands 9,815 0.660
Iceland 679 2.311 Lebanon 596 0.596
Estonia 2,162 2.225 Cambodia  45 0.573
Norway 9,157 2.067 Hong Kong 2,570 0.527
Finland 8,921 2.031 Hungary 3,238 0.524
Ireland 4,161 1.367 Australia 7,321 0.463
Table 2. The 28 countries with the highest numbers of polls per thousand
Internet users, and their number of polls in our data set.
[H.1.2] In line with the previous discussion on the link be-
tween scheduling activity and economic growth, we had hy-
pothesized that the number of polls per Internet user and
country correlates with the GDP per capita. Those countries
with a higher afﬂuence do indeed show more scheduling ac-
tivity on Doodle, conﬁrming H.1.2. The result also indicates
that Doodle use might be a function of the amount of white-
collarworkinthesecountrieswithstrongereconomies, which
usually leads to a greater need for scheduling.
[H.1.3] The number of polls per internet user and country
also signiﬁcantly correlates with Levine and Norenzayan’s
pace of life study. We found correlations with walking speed
(rs(29) =  :56, p < :001), postal speed (rs(29) =  :56;p <
:001), and clock accuracy (rs(29) =  :47;p < :01). Thus,
the faster a country’s pace of life (represented by a smaller
2Liechtenstein was not included in Hofstede’s original study, and is
therefore not part of our analyses involving Hofstede’s scores.
number of seconds), the higher the number of polls per In-
ternet user. If the data is normalized instead by population
size (i.e., number of polls per capita), we see the same sig-
niﬁcance. We can therefore conﬁrm Hypotheses 1.1, 1.2, and
1.3 even when not accounting for the effect of Internet pen-
etration. Altogether, our ﬁrst set of results suggests that In-
ternet users use Doodle with a higher frequency if they come
fromindividualist countrieswithhigh economicviability, and
a fast pace of life.
[H.2.1] In support of Hypothesis 2.1 we found that Doodle
users from countries with a high Individualism plan further in
advance. Figure 3 provides an overview of the advance plan-
ning times in relation to the countries’ Individualism scores.
There are a few outliers. Mexico, a country that is often
regarded as having a laid-back, event-time culture, follows
Switzerland and Germany with a high advance planning time
of 28 days. In the Survival/Self-expression dimension, Mexi-
cans have transitioned from a culture of “survival” towards a
self-expression score of 1.03 over the last 10 years. In com-
parison, Germany has a lower self-expression score of 0.44
(West) and 0.42 (East), while Switzerland has a higher self-
expression score of 1.90. Inglehart relates changes from sur-
vival to more self-expression as Mexico has experienced it to
an increasing economic development and industrialization—
in which time becomes more important. While the impor-
tance of time in societies with a higher self-expression has
previously only been hypothesized, our data demonstrates
that the dimension can be indeed a good predictor of advance
scheduling time (rs(48) =   :67, p < :001).
This also shows in another outlier: Hungary only plans ahead
13.7 days, yet with an Individualism score of 80 is regarded
as a highly individualist country. Again, the low score of
-1.22 in the Survival/Self-Expression dimension might be
more suitable to explain the result. Lastly, American Doo-
dle users schedule much more spontaneously (on average 17
days in advance) than their high Individualism score of 91, as
well as their high Self-Expression score of 1.76 would sug-
gest. This is very comparable to Thailand, China, Singapore,
who plan between 15 and 18 days in advance, yet whose na-
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Figure 3. Average advance planning times in days in relation to Individualism scores. Error bars represent the standard error within one country.
[H.2.2] We also assumed that in countries with a higher in-
dividualism options might be speciﬁed with more detail, a
hypothesis that was conﬁrmed for polls with options deﬁned
at the 5-minute precision level (e.g., 4:35 p.m.). Individual-
ist countries schedule their events more often with a preci-
sion of 5 minutes. The correlation was also conﬁrmed for the
Survival/Self-expression values (rs(52) = :34;p < :01).
Interestingly, we cannot substantiate this hypothesis for polls
with options at a 10 or 15 minute precision level. It is likely
that the overall number of these polls in our data set is too
low to fully verify a relationship between Individualism and
precisionlevel. Infact, only2%ofthepollscontainedoptions
that had been deﬁned with a 5 minute precision, 10 minute
precision, or a 15 minute precision. In contrast, the plurality
of polls (41%) has their option time set to the full hour.
[H.2.3] The average response time across all polls per coun-
try signiﬁcantly correlates with the dimension Individual-
ism, therefore substantiating Hypothesis 2.3. Participants in
countries with a higher individualism tend to provide their
choices later than participants of collectivist countries. A
strong correlation with the Survival/Self-expression values
(rs(48) = :67;p < :001) conﬁrms this result.
The ﬁnding can be partly attributed to the fact that coun-
tries high in individualism and self-expression plan much
more in advance, as we have shown in H.2.1. Countries like
Switzerland and Germany, who plan their events longest in
advance, are now the ones that take longest to respond—on
average 44.1 and 45.1 hours after the poll was set up. This
is in contrast to Bulgaria, South Korea, Lebanon, and Viet-
nam with respond times ranging between 14.1 and 18.6 hours
(Bulgaria being the fastest). However, even when control-
ling for the advance planning time, Individualism remains a
strong predictor for longer response times (multiple regres-
sion, F(2;73) = 12:11;p < :001;adj:r2 = :23).
The cause for this is likely to be a function of individual-
ists’ least-commitment behavior. By responding late, indi-
vidualists seem to defer making time commitments, perhaps
because an early response requires blocking time in their cal-
endar longer. Such least-commitment behavior in individual-
ist countries strategically maximizes personal beneﬁt, which
collectivists tend to be opposed to [19].
AnotableoutlierinthecorrelationofresponsetimewithIndi-
vidualism is China (m = 40, sd = 3:6 hours), whose partic-
ipants respond similarly late as the UK and Luxembourg, yet
China is thought to have a strong collectivist culture. We be-
lieve that this demonstrates where cultural dimensions alone
cannot explain the variance in behavior that we are observ-
ing in our data. First of all, China has recently experienced
enormous economic growth, probably resulting in a shift to-
wards individualism. China is also classiﬁed as low on the
Survival/Self-expression dimension, but Inglehart acknowl-
edges that growing economies can be expected to result in
a country’s shift towards higher self-expression [21]. What
we see in our data might therefore reﬂect “the emergence of
a prosperous, educated, and self-conﬁdent middle-class” [21]
that weakens the traditional values of Confucian culture. Chi-
nese Doodle users might belong to a growing sub-cultural
group that relates less to the Confucian subjectivity of time,
but instead adopted a more Western time perception. This
subcultural group within China could possibly become more
prone to the least-commitment behavior.
Interestingly, participants respond signiﬁcantly faster to open
polls (m = 35:6;sd = 6 hours) than to hidden polls (m =
45:4;sd = 15:8 hours), Z(17) =  2:68, p < :01, r = :42.3
In hidden polls, they have the opportunity to wait before com-
mitting to block certain times in their calendars without other
participantsnoticing. Inopenpolls, however, peoplemightbe
well aware of the fact that the ﬁrst participants often strongly
inﬂuence the outcome of the poll, and thus, are eager to state
their availabilities earlier.
[H.3.1] The fraction of options that reach consensus neg-
atively correlates with Individualism, supporting Hypothe-
sis 3.1. Collectivist countries ﬁnd on average more consensus
than individualists. However, some countries agree on sig-
niﬁcantly more options than others, sometimes independent
of what their Individualism score would predict. In India, an























































Figure 4. The average fraction of consensus options per country in open polls and hidden polls. Error bars show the standard error.
average of 28% of options ﬁnd mutual agreement. As Fig-
ure 4 shows, this is the highest number in our data set and a
strong contrast to the US, whose Doodle users only ﬁnd con-
sensus on an average of 15% of options. India is regarded as
a collectivist country in which individual’s actions are highly
inﬂuenced by other’s opinions. Its Individualism score of 48
seems to underestimate how much its people are willing to
adjust their availabilities in order to ﬁnd mutual agreement.
The countries with the second and third most consensus
options are China and Japan (with 26% and 24%, respec-
tively). Both are collectivist societies by Western standards,
but Chinahas a much strongerextended family system, which
forms the basis of most collectivist societies. In contrast,
Japan is usually regarded to deviate from other Asian cul-
tures, but its collectivist values seem to remain inﬂuential:
Seeking consensus can be interpreted as an active effort to
keep harmony—a characteristic usually associated with col-
lectivist cultures. In fact, Japan’s high fraction of consensus
options in our Doodle data veriﬁes the ﬁndings of Mann et
al. [31] who had found that Japanese participants preferred to
collectively make decisions.
[H.3.2] According to the ﬁndings of our last hypothesis, peo-
ple are rethinking their availabilities in an effort to ﬁnd a mu-
tually agreeable time—but they are not able to do this in hid-
den polls. In support of H.3.2, we found a signiﬁcant differ-
ence between the fraction of options that reach consensus be-
tween hidden and open polls (see Table 1). Open polls reach
almost double as many consensus options (m = 20:3 %
options, sd = 2:5%) than hidden polls (m = 11:2%,
sd = 5:7 %). This demonstrates that people are indeed
highly inﬂuenced by the choices of other poll participants and
are actively trying to ﬁnd mutual agreement.
Figure 4 shows that the fraction of consensus options reached
in hidden polls highly differs between countries. This is due
to how many availabilities participants offer in general (as
discussed in the results of the next hypothesis). However, the
difference between the fraction of consensus options in open
and hidden polls can also be regarded as the amount of ef-
fort that people put in to reach consensus in open polls, com-
pared to the “baseline” hidden polls, in which they cannot see
other’s choices. This difference is largest for the collectivist
countries China and Colombia, suggesting that these coun-
tries put a higher effort into ﬁnding mutual consensus.
[H.3.3] Individualism signiﬁcantly correlates with the frac-
tion of options that participants agree to. Contrary to our hy-
pothesis, however, participants with a higher Individualism
score show more availabilities. As might be expected, the
fraction of availabilities slightly increases the further ahead
of the actual event the poll was set up. However, even
when controlling for the planning ahead time and the num-
ber of options (which could potentially confound the frac-
tion of times that people are willing to commit to), the rela-
tionship remains positive and signiﬁcant (multiple regression,
F(2;48) = 18:72;p < :001;adj:r2 = :41).
Collectivists show less availabilities, yet in our analysis of
Hypothesis 3.1 we found that they ﬁnd more consensus op-
tions. Both ﬁndings in combination indicate that collectivists
must be explicitly targeting their few availabilities at those
options that are likely to reach consensus.
The correlation between the fraction of options that partici-
pants agree to and Individualism also remains true in hidden
polls (rs(51) = :32;p < :05), albeit in a weaker form. More-
over, participants agree to a signiﬁcantly larger fraction of
options in open polls (m = 53:7% availabilities, sd = 3:8%)
than in hidden polls (m = 39:6% availabilities, sd = 10:9%),
Z(59) =  6:38;p < :001;r =  :83. Iceland, Lithuania,
Slovakia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Serbia show the greatest
change in behavior when using hidden polls by reducing their
availabilities by a factor of 3.
[H.3.4] The fraction of if-need-be answers show a weak in-
verse relationship with Individualism, suggesting that collec-
tivists answer with “if-need-be” slightly more often. The cor-
relation is signiﬁcant with the Survival/Self-expression di-
mension (rs(50) =  :52;p < :001), indicating that these
values are more predictive of a country’s tendency to use
if-need-be. The countries that answer if-need-be most often
are Hungary, Slovenia, Latvia, Russia, Czech Republic, and
China with 13% to 14.7%. With the exception of Slovenia
and the Czech Republic, all of these countries rank low on
the Survival/Self-expression dimension, but not all of them
are regarded as collectivist cultures. Hungary and the Czech
8Republic, for example, received Individualism scores of 80
and 58, respectively. In contrast, Liechtenstein, Switzer-
land, Luxembourg and France, countries that rank high in
self-expression and Individualism, use if-need-be least often
(7.6-9.1%). The relationship with Survival/Self-expression
remains equally strong when regarding if-need-be answers as
a resort to declining an option (rs(50) =  :57;p < :001).
DISCUSSION
When discussing the effect of technology on culture, people
often assume that the world is slowly homogenizing into a
culture of Internet users, who share similar values and behav-
ioral norms [29, 17]. Our analysis of the online scheduling
behavior on Doodle argues against this hypothesis.
In fact, Doodle users around the world use the tool very dif-
ferently: Our data indicates that individualists strategically
respond late, perhaps in order to make fewer time commit-
ments and maximize their own ﬂexibility [35, 41]. Our re-
sults also demonstrate that across the world, people are steer-
ing their availabilities towards those options that have good
chances to reach consensus, which shows in a signiﬁcantly
higher number of consensus options in open polls compared
to hidden polls. But collectivists seem to make a larger ef-
fort to reach mutual agreement: Polls initiated in collectivist
countries ﬁnd more consensus options, while their partici-
pants indicate fewer availabilities. This is consistent with pre-
vious ﬁndings in the decision-making literature: Collectivists
are more likely to conform to other people’s decisions and
choices [1, 31]. However, the ﬁnding also implies that collec-
tivist participants must predominantly show availabilities for
those options that have a good chance of ﬁnding consensus.
Individualists show more availabilities, but seem to agree to
options despite knowing that these will not reach consensus.
One possible interpretation is that they want to appear ﬂexi-
ble and willing to ﬁnd consensus, while hoping to change the
poll outcome to their preferred option [13, 35, 41].
Such differences in scheduling behavior can lead to misin-
terpretations of other’s behavior and challenges in intercul-
tural collaboration [4]. For example, if collectivists schedule
more spontaneously, individualist participants might feel that
showing availability close to the actual event could indicate
to others that they are not as busy as they would like to ap-
pear. Conversely, if individualists set up polls a long time in
advance, collectivists might expect a higher importance of the
event when it may not be.
Likewise, differences in expectations towards people’s re-
sponse time can cause friction. Collectivists might see a late
responseasunsocialbehavior: Theyareblockingtimeintheir
calendar while other participants seem to perceive their own
time as more important.
Furthermore, if collectivists show less availabilities, individu-
alists could understand this as a lower willingness to ﬁnd con-
sensus. Collectivists, on the other hand, might have a higher
expectation that poll participants adjust their availabilities for
the beneﬁt of the group and that they conﬁrm options that
will likely reach consensus. Thus, a rejection of these lead-
ing options might be perceived as selﬁsh behavior in more
group-oriented cultures.
To mitigate similar misunderstandings, intercultural training
usually focuses on raising awareness about cultural differ-
ences, as well as on suggesting behavioral adjustments [4].
A combination of both could also facilitate scheduling within
and across cultures: One possibility to invoke a certain re-
sponse behavior, for example, would be to set a deadline by
which participants have to respond to polls. This has the pos-
itive side effect of removing the penalty for participants that
respond quickly—those participants no longer have to keep
all options they agreed to open. To increase chances of ﬁnd-
ing a mutually agreeable time, scheduling systems could also
emphasize options that are likely to reach consensus, or ex-
plicitly notify a participant when s/he declines options that
otherwise suited everyone. Notiﬁcations could supplement
Doodle’s current display of majority vote(s), but would more
directly point out which choice(s) inhibit ﬁnding consensus.
Intercultural training additionally suggests to raise awareness
of ethnocentric or culturally insensitive behaviors, and to pro-
vide people with the appropriate knowledge of cultural dif-
ferences [4]. Scheduling systems could do so by display-
ing informational tool-tips and providing feedback (as sug-
gested in [10]). This information could already support the
poll setup. In some countries, for example, we have seen
longer response times, or that people showed less availabil-
ities when using hidden polls. Depending on the poll initia-
tor’s country (e.g., as indicated by her IP address), scheduling
systems could inform about these likely behaviors. Moreover,
the system could guide the poll setup by providing advice on
optional settings, such as the pros and cons of hidden versus
open polls, or when a deadline option might be appropriate.
If a poll is likely to include participants from several differ-
ent countries (e.g., if the initiator turns on time zone support),
scheduling systems could more generally inform poll initia-
tors about scheduling differences between cultures.
Similar information could also be useful for participants:
Scheduling systems could automatically detect whether peo-
ple’s IP addresses suggest a multinational team, and inform
about possible differences in other participants’ scheduling
behavior. Our ﬁndings can serve as a basis for these explana-
tions, and help mitigate possible misunderstandings in inter-
cultural scheduling.
LIMITATIONS, FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
The results of this paper conﬁrm our research question: Cul-
tureinﬂuenceshowwescheduleeventsonline. Incomparison
toindividualistsocieties, suchastheUS,moregroup-oriented
collectivist countries respond to polls earlier, indicate fewer
availabilities, but seem to make a larger effort to reach mutual
agreement. The results provide empirical evidence of these
behavioral variations when people schedule online, and indi-
cate possible reasons for misunderstandings when scheduling
across cultures. We believe that increasing the awareness of
these differences can help improve intercultural scheduling
and support the acceptance of cultural differences as an inter-
esting contribution to our lives.
Our analysis of Doodle date/time polls was an empirically
powerful way to unobtrusively investigate such variations be-
tweencountries, butitisobviousthatfutureworkneedstoad-
dress several shortcomings. Speciﬁcally, we intend to follow
9up our ﬁndings with interviews and surveys in order to ensure
that the behavioral differences observed between countries
are not the result of a varying use of Doodle. For example,
the current data set did not provide us with any information
about the purpose for which polls were scheduled, potential
hierarchies between poll participants, or whether Doodle is
mostly used to schedule work or leisure time activities in a
speciﬁc country. Future work also needs to clarify whether
the behavioral differences are the result of varying job sec-
tors between countries rather than the inﬂuence of national
culture. Last but not least, we would be delighted to see our
results compared to, and complemented with, similar event
scheduling data of international organizations or of another
online event scheduling service.
ONLINE APPENDIX
To enable others to validate and extend our results, our data
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